[Handwritten addition: Excerpts from VVS MfS 160 No. 814/72
Research results on the topic

"The qualification of political-operative work
to combat hostile phenomena
among young people in the GDR"]

4.5. Possibilities and ways for the qualified and creative implementation of specific subversion measures against anti-state groups and groups of young people with anti-state tendencies

Political-operational subversion is an objective requirement for qualified and socially effective case management.

4.5.1. The necessity of intensifying the application of subversion methods in operational procedures concerning youth.

In the area of youth, the imperialist class enemy is attempting to conduct intensified, more differentiated, more sophisticated, and long-term political-ideological subversion and hostile contact policies, applying these with refined methods of subversion and infiltration of segments of the youth.

The subversive struggle against the youth of the GDR will intensify in the future.

The class enemy is exploiting the specific characteristics of adolescence, which make infiltration of the youth of the GDR appear sensible and effective.

The consequence: The Stasi must develop more proactive and clandestine countermeasures against imperialist subversion tactics.

A primary objective of operational procedures against suspected juveniles is their preventative nature, i.e., to protect them from committing planned or further crimes.

Against young people under 25, subversion measures often have a more lasting effect than involuntary commitment.

- Typical characteristic of the class enemy's sophisticated attack:

Methods of hostile activity among young people often cannot be combated using criminal law measures under the existing criminal law provisions.

Political considerations may make it seem expedient to refrain from applying criminal law measures against young people; the decision depends firstly on the composition of the group of people being dealt with and secondly on the political-operational situation.

[Handwritten addition: Authors: Colonel Pommer, Colonel Schwanitz, Lieutenant Colonel Dr. Schäfer]

4.5.2. The specific areas of application of decomposition methods in the field of youth

Methods of subversion in the operational handling of anti-state groups of young people or groups of young people with anti-state tendencies in VAO or OV occur when, Methods of hostile activity are not relevant under the existing criminal law provisions.

A typical example is groups that engage with revisionist, left-wing radical, Maoist, or social democratic ideas and exert corresponding political and ideological subversion on their environment.

The same applies to groups of young people who misuse religious or church institutions and organizational forms such as the Protestant Student Community (ESG), Catholic Student Community (KSG), or Young Community to, for example, actively solicit conscientious objectors under the guise of so-called mentorship relationships.

Likewise, this applies to groups of young people who disseminate and popularize the content of books and poems by authors living in socialist countries who are enemies of socialism.

This applies when participants in suspected anti-state groups or groups of young people are children of prominent figures whose criminal prosecution in the GDR and beyond would have politically damaging consequences.

This includes children of well-known scientists, church dignitaries, and the like.

If a suspected anti-state group of young people exists within internationally known and respected state institutions, such that this prosecution could have negative political repercussions for the GDR beyond its borders, negatively impacting the GDR 's growing

international reputation, including Humboldt University, Karl Marx University, and the October Club, among others.

Particularly vulnerable groups of people – students, young artists, young members of the intelligentsia, pupils of EOS – since such persons may hold important positions in the future in the state apparatus, economy, research, culture, mass media, etc., it is important to prevent the consolidation of hostile positions or the commission of crimes through subversive work.

The initiators and organizers of such dangerous associations may be citizens of the GDR, West Berlin, or other non-EU countries who identify themselves as "left-wing".

Method of decomposition correctly in combating hostile contact activity

Further areas of application include criminal groups with anti-state tendencies.

The fundamental application of subversion and its methods, which make discrimination impossible and guard against contempt, is solely against hostile and criminal forces.

4.5.3. The specific objectives of subversion within the framework of operational case management in the field of youth

The aims of this subversion arise from the nature of preventive political-operational work among young people, as well as the promotion of a more positive development among them.

Measures are designed in such a way that the majority of young people distance themselves from the hostile initiators and organizers, initiating a process of rethinking that is continued through activities of state and societal forces initiated and influenced by the Ministry for State Security (MfS) .

The Stasi 's contribution to enforcing the youth policies of the party and government.

In its subversive activities, it consistently exploited favorable opportunities for recruiting new informants or placing existing ones in operationally relevant roles and within circles.

4.5.4. Information on effective means and methods of subversion in the context of case management against suspected juvenile groups.

See also GVS MfS 160, No. 252/72 "Requirements and methods for a concentrated, proactive, rational and socially effective case management"

The scope and complexity of the decomposition measures, and thus their effort, must be proportionate to the content and significance of the operational process being handled.

Regarding decomposition objectives and the means and methods to be applied, a distinction must be made between the following group types.

1. Anti-state groups of young people with sophisticated conspiratorial methods

2. Groups of young people with anti-state tendencies under the influence of, for example, pastors, church officials, etc.

3. Opposition and criminal groups of young people with anti-state tendencies

The basis of the subversion process:

Verified initial information, thorough consideration and planning, focusing not on isolated individual measures, but on the processual nature of the subversion until the objective is achieved.

Implement meaningful combinations of criminal, disciplinary, and other state and societal measures.

The most important prerequisite:

Vet-checked informants within the group to assess the effects of individual measures.

Involving informants in the subversion process requires informants with a healthy sense of class hatred and a certain level of operational maturity to fulfill tasks and to maintain absolute secrecy in concrete and specific situations;

- otherwise, the group will become even more cohesive, secrecy will increase, they will demonstratively stand up for the young people to be isolated, and opposition to

security forces will grow.

The decision regarding the knowing involvement of informants in the subversion process and their initiation depends on the following factors:

1. Means and methods of subversion to be applied.

2. Assessment of the informant's personality, his political and ideological stance and character qualities, proven loyalty to the Stasi, strict adherence to secrecy.

3. Personal relationship of the informant to the group and to individual members, in particular personal friendships, sympathies, and intimate relationships.

Through a process of disintegration,
- disgust,
- disappointment, and
- aversion towards the initiators and organizers of the group

must be aroused in the majority of the group through their own experience.

They skillfully exploit
- trustingness,
- a need to communicate,
- an immature and sometimes exaggerated sense of justice,
- a tendency to oppose those stronger,
- a tendency to exaggerate,
- a thirst for knowledge and action,
- a lack of life experience, and
- jealousy.

The Ministry for State Security (MfS) must not be identifiable as the originator of subversive measures;
- young people must not be driven into further opposition to the socialist state power through subversive measures.

The content of the debunking measures must be
- predominantly based on truth and
- be verifiable by the group; for this purpose,

it is necessary to obtain verified initial information on the following areas:
- 1. Moral state of the youth group being worked on (political quagmire usually leads to moral quagmire)

- 2. Personal relationships between group members, friendship and personal reservations, personal dislikes, etc.
- 3. Character traits of group members, e.g. , envy, intrigue, ambition, greed, boastfulness, ruthlessness, etc.
- 4. Do not set the requirements for verified source material too high regarding skills and hobbies, manners, and idioms, especially those of the initiators and ringleaders.

When using informant information about the aforementioned internal group matters, be aware that informants will not expose themselves through its use.

Apply forms, means, and methods of subversion adapted to the educational level and abilities of the respective group members.

Make the methods of subversion somewhat unconventional, e.g.
- Anonymous phone calls at night,
- letters from the KA (presumably a local authority),
- organized visits by outsiders to the group meeting based on fabricated invitations,
- placement of advertisements to which a number of citizens are required to respond and whose content casts suspicion on some group members,
- a note by an initiator regarding behaviors and actions from which many members distance themselves – thus achieving a decline in the initiator's influence
- conspicuous identity checks when crossing the border, including targeted questioning with "accidental remarks"
- differentiated introduction of travel bans,
- confiscation of DPA,
- Initiation of individual criminal procedural measures against individual group members, possibly choosing an operationally coordinated sequence, e.g.
  - arrests,
  - house searches,
  - summonses,
  - targeted reservations during interrogations,
  - releases from pre-trial detention,
  - non-execution of an arrest warrant,
  - in order to organize suspicion or a search for traitors within the group in order to incriminate the spokespeople and ringleaders.
- Differentiated implementation of administrative and educational measures in evaluation of EV, e.g.,
  - religious conversions,
  - deregistration,
  - personnel changes in youth clubs,

- Targeted contact with specific members of the group, where it can be assessed that they reject cooperation with the MfS and spread the content of the conversation within the group,
- exploitation of police operations or quotas and disciplinary proceedings for subversion.

The latter measures are primarily applicable against juvenile criminal groups with anti-state tendencies.

The aim of these measures is
- to foster suspicion and speculation within the group,
- with each member swearing they haven't told anyone.
- The conclusion is drawn that the source is an insider from within their own ranks, thus enabling a search for a traitor.
- Distrust develops, and
- hostile activity loses intensity and effectiveness due to fear of legal repercussions.
- The result is a process of dissolution and disintegration that must be further accelerated through appropriate measures.

Operational example:

In a large, anti-state group of young people belonging to a religious student association, there were two functionaries who shared a fundamentally negative political stance towards Marxist-Leninist (ML), the Socialist Unity Party of Germany (SED), and the GDR.

An anonymous letter campaign was launched against one of them, in which he was strongly attacked, his personal weaknesses and self-serving actions at the expense of the group were listed.

This sparked discussions among the group members, splitting the group into two factions.

In this situation, a second anonymous letter campaign was launched, praising the attacked functionary to such an extent that it repulsed the recipients.

This created a complicated situation, the apparent existence of two rival factions within the group, leading to everyone testing each other.

Insults and provocative statements arose, and the informants were instructed to actively support the writer's claims.

A particularly provocative group member was implicated by a fabricated advertisement for the intended sale of items that the member actually owned.

- Potential buyers appeared, made contact, and
- within the group, an anonymous denial of the sale intentions was circulated.
- The operative, acting as an advisor to the Stasi informant, skillfully managed the group's operations, as he abhorred anonymity.
- The group was thus forced to focus its efforts internally,
  - negative political activities ceased, and
  - signs of disintegration set in.

In individual cases, it is possible to steer groups in positive directions of development, particularly groups still in their formative stages.

Here, the use of state organs and social institutions through targeted information from the Ministry for State Security (MfS) can be exploited.

The process of positive transformation of individual group members can be supported through the deployment of suitable, qualified informants.

In this context, it is important to know who introduces

  - negative,
  - hostile,
  - politically and
- ideologically alien moral views and behaviors into the groups, and
  - how, as well as
  - which
- young people within the group are most susceptible to the transformation process.

The position of the informants as recognized and influential members of the group is significant in this regard.

It is advantageous if an informant is an "idol" of the group members, surpassing the others in intelligence and experience.

Such influential informants should

- systematically and convincingly refute hostile arguments based on facts.
- Expose the contradictions between hostile views, arguments, and reality in the GDR and

    - skillfully, and sometimes indirectly, prove the validity of the ML (Marxist-Leninist) narrative.
    - It is essential that a portion of the group agrees with this approach.
- Examine any negative role models the young people may consciously imitate or identify with.
    - Destroy their belief in these negative role models.
- Isolate or eliminate group members who attempt to disrupt or prevent the effectiveness of the informants through appropriate administrative and legal measures
    - (e.g., conscription into the National People's Army,
    - deployment to assembly sites).
- Encourage the positive work of the informants within the groups by placing them in the group's environment, such as workplaces, training facilities, and leisure activities.

Successful implementation of the process,
    - positive transformation of hostile groups, young people, or groups with anti-state tendencies,
- is a significant success in political-operational work,
    - as it deprives the class enemy of its operational base and
    - wins over GDR youth to social society.

4.6. Some essential tasks of the operational service units after the conclusion of operational procedures against hostile youth groups

In the operational handling of such groups, the following are essential:
- first, to break the conspiracy of hostile individuals;
- second, to gather necessary evidence;
- third, to prevent and restrict hostile activity;
- fourth, to uncover and eliminate favorable conditions, and
    - to solve other significant operational tasks.

The completion of such operational measures requires thorough
    - planning,
    - preparation, and
    - execution
- to achieve the highest possible effectiveness of the operational destabilization process.

Following the conclusion of such political-operational proceedings against
    - young people who intended to or have committed anti-state activities,

- the following tasks,
  - which overlap and cannot be separated,
  - are necessary as a unified whole.
- 1. Planned, systematic cooperation with Line IX
- 2. Initiation of OPK (Operational Control Measures) against specific young persons
- 3. Recruitment of IMs (Informal Collaborators) and IM candidates during the exclusion phase
- 4. Imposition of further coercive measures and favorable conditions

4.6.1. Implementation of planned and systematic cooperation with Line IX.

After the conclusion of the OV or OVA, in which anti-state activities of young persons were examined or processed, further operational work among these persons becomes necessary.

Discussions among the young people :

- What triggers the investigative actions,
- how do the young people assess the measures,
- are contacts being established with West Berlin or the Federal Republic of Germany,
- are new anti-state acts being planned and prepared,
  - among other things, Section 213, joint consultation with Department IX on
    - how the
      - type,
      - sequence and
      - timing of
    - the investigative actions to be carried out as well as
    - other operational tasks
  - offer the most favorable options.

Utilize the capabilities of Line IX to conduct investigative actions, such as
- interviewing specific individuals, solely in the interest of operational objectives.
- Rapidly obtain the necessary documentary evidence
  - for Line IX 's investigative work
  - through operational personnel from Line XX and other lines.

4.6.2. Introduction of OPK against certain young persons

Following the conclusion of OV, OVA against hostile youth groups,
  - in which some members of the group were imprisoned but others were not,
- it must be examined to what extent an OPK must be initiated against the youths who are at liberty
  - in accordance with Directive 1/71 of the Comrade Minister.

Objective:

- To assess the behavior of individuals following the measures taken,
- to identify connections to West Germany, specifically West Berlin,
- to assess efforts to form new groups,
- to prepare further direct hostile actions, and potentially
- to recruit them for unofficial cooperation.

The operation is temporary in nature.

4.6.3 Recruitment of IMs and IM candidates during the process closure phase

Case Conclusion:

The information gathered,
  - witness statements, and
  - interrogations
- must be used
  - to inform young people about further measures and
  - to facilitate their continued unofficial cooperation.

In doing so, consider
  - the basis for the decision,
  - the willingness to make amends, and
  - the impact of the coercive and other measures taken,
- and make a swift decision.

Critically
- examine the sincerity of any promises made,
  - do not overvalue them, and
- ensure that the subsequent phase of unofficial cooperation is particularly intensive.

Consider

- investigating the extent to which individuals are already being used
  - for unofficial work in cooperation with Line IX or Line VII,
    - even during their time in custody.

4.6.4. Instigation of further state coercive measures and elimination of the favorable conditions

Nature of tasks that can be initiated by other state bodies as coercive measures, etc.
- Initiation and implementation of
  - further coercive measures,
  - elimination of conditions that facilitate criminal offenses
  - Inclusion of young people in positive social work.

This includes,
- expulsion of students,
- religious instruction,
- placement in youth work camps,
- work education,
- residence restrictions,
- entry bans for persons from the Federal Republic of Germany, Berlin (West),
- active involvement of parents in the educational process,
- improved educational work in
  - schools,
  - businesses,
  - universities,
- increased security in certain areas,
  - taking into account the complexity of these influences and
- doing everything possible to prevent the influence of other negative youths.

The basis for the cooperation between the service units of
  - the Ministry for State Security (MfS) and
  - the German People's Police (Deutsche Volkspolizei)
- in combating hostile negative phenomena among young people is
  - Order 11/66 and
  - DA 4/66 of the Minister, as well as
  - the following documents of the Minister of the Interior and Chief of the German People's Police:
    - Directive 4/68 of July 1, 1968;
    - Service Regulation No. 031/70

- for the control of persons by the German People's Police, the Prison Service, dated October 22, 1970;
- Instruction No. 026/71 of the Head of the Main Department of Criminal Police
  - concerning the organizational tasks of the control of persons
    - in accordance with Service Regulation 030/70 of the Minister of the Interior and Chief of the German People's Police;
- Instruction No. 018/72
  - concerning measures to ensure a high level of public order and security on special occasions,
    - dated January 14, 1972; and
- Instruction No. 59/70 of the Deputy Chief of the German People's Police
  - concerning the tasks the section representative of the German People's Police
    - to support other state bodies in carrying out measures
      - to prevent and combat complex crime.

The following factors are worth noting when shaping cooperation with the comrades of the DVP : [strikethrough: v]
- Securing
  - secrecy and
  - conspiracy
- Ensuring
  - continuity and
  - adherence to the plan
- Appropriate and stable structuring of cooperation.

Important here is a
  - coordinated,
  - sensible and
  - focused approach,
- especially when...
  - direct combating of
    - anti-state activities and
    - other serious crimes
- Organizing effective preventive measures
- Elimination of favorable conditions.

4.4.2. Targeted political-operational training of IM / GMS for the timely detection of hostile phenomena among young people

Education for
- reliability and
- honesty in
- unofficial cooperation;
- the basis and focus of this educational process is
  - the education of political-ideological reliability,
    - taking into account changes in the national class struggle situation,
  - dismantling illusions about the state-monopoly system,
  - developing a correct image of the enemy, and
  - systematically expanding their political-ideological conviction.

Training in discipline within unofficial cooperation particularly concerns
- the execution of orders and
- adherence to meetings,
- applying appropriate moral and material incentives.
- Imparting skills to informants that enable them,
  - firstly, to maintain
    - secrecy and
    - confidentiality;
  - secondly, to develop the skills to work with
    - cover stories and
    - combinations; and
  - thirdly, to be capable of
    - assessment and
    - observation tasks.
- Developing self-control skills in young informants;
- ensuring their
  - availability and
  - future prospects during their training;
- binding young informants to the Stasi;
- correctly
  - evaluating and
  - utilizing successes; and
- ensuring that each informant identifies with the Stasi in their attitude.

2.6.2. Work of the non-structural youth working groups in the BV to increase the effectiveness in combating hostile phenomena among the youth

Tasks:

- Orienting the service units towards
  - identifying and
  - resolving
  - the key issues,
- Further qualify basic operational processes according to
  - the territorial situation
- Ensuring the necessary cooperation of the operational service units

Working groups focused on youth
- serve as a starting point for new ideas,
- unlocking further potential in political-operational work and
- inspiring the operational work of service units.

Forms of work in the Youth Working Group that have been particularly preserved:
- Advice on the political-operational situation among young people,
- informing service units
  - about the diverse new problems arising from the attacks of the class enemy on the youth of the GDR,
  - about possibilities their effective defense and the cooperation of the service units and other bodies in this process [Omission] and
- conducting training sessions with the responsible operational staff
  - on pursuing new approaches in political-operational work to effectively combat hostile and negative phenomena among young people.

At the beginning of each consultation, provide a brief operational overview of the situation in the area of responsibility.

Evaluate semi-annual and annual analyses of the situation among young people.

Discuss important details of operational work among young people.

Address the opponent's attacks against young people in the area of public education. The enemy's attacks against youth in the areas of

- public education,
- universities,
- technical schools,
- company vocational schools,
- apprentice dormitories, and
- the security measures to be derived from them.

Problems of the enemy's contact policy and activities among young people and
- new operational tasks,
  - especially those resulting from visa-free travel, e.g., in some socialist countries, Situation among socially and criminally at-risk youth in connection with the situation
  - in restaurants,
  - youth clubs,
  - dance events,
  - Church activities among young people
  - and the conclusions drawn from them

Measures to secure certain events on the occasion of social highlights,
- Utilizing the potential of informants / GMS within the DE (German Intelligence Service) to solve counterintelligence tasks among the youth, e.g.,
  - through work on complex assignments,
  - deployment of informants in key positions,
  - work with FIM (Financial Intelligence Unit),
  - and youth working group consultations,
    - which largely consist of an exchange of experience.
- The consultations also offer new value
  - in preparing decisions for the Deputy Head of Operations and
  - in providing guidance for planning within the youth line.

Practice of
  - information exchange and
  - the sharing of new findings
- among members of the Youth Working Group.

Addressing issues of
- cooperation with
  - the bodies of the German People 's Police (DVP) as well as
  - other parts of the state apparatus and social organizations.

Reports from KD (Criminal Investigation Department) leaders on
- the operational situation,
- cooperation with
  - the People's Police, and
  - other state bodies are also valuable .

For the training of operational staff, it has proven beneficial to focus on the following problems:
- Deployment of IM / GMS
  - to combat hostile phenomena and
  - the resulting requirements for
    - commissioning,
    - securing unofficial cooperation with persons under 18 years of age,
    - special features of operational case management against juveniles,
    - criteria and requirements for operational surveillance of juveniles,

3.1. Focused search and selection of suitable young people, IM candidates

Prerequisite:

Clear definition of the political-operational priorities among young people in the area of responsibility.

Critical inventory and assessment of the existing IM / GMS system in order to identify existing gaps that need to be closed through appropriate new recruitment.

The starting point for the search for such young people is
- the existing informants / informants among coaches,
- officials of sports clubs, and
- teachers at extended secondary schools and polytechnic high schools.

The aim is
- to identify young people as young as 14 or 15,
- to utilize the children
  - of informants and
  - operational staff
  - for information gathering, and
- to identify particularly good sources of information for

    - the search and
    - selection
  - of young informant candidates.

The DVP 's Orange (a local branch of the Stasi) is a particularly good source of information for the search and selection of young informant candidates, as are
- the youth welfare and residential care departments of the district councils, as well as
- information and individuals encountered through public relations work.
- Furthermore, the existing archives of
  - the Ministry for State Security (MfS) and
  - the DVP
  - should be utilized accordingly.
- Of course, line-specific procedures must be observed; that is,
  - information from the DVP is obtained by Line VII ,
  - information from the district council by Line XX /1, and so on.

Special considerations in the investigation of young potential informants

1. Little informative material is available about the young people.

2. Qualitative changes in the young people's consciousness are possible within a short time; that is, assessments given about them may quickly become unobjective and lose their value.

3. Typically, a change in the behavior of young people is observed
- in their leisure time,
- at school, and
- at home; that is,
- for many young people, behavior in these three areas is not consistent or uniform.

Therefore, it is necessary to use existing information from informants to develop the following:

1. Precise
- investigation and
- assessment of
- the actual
  - political and
  - ideological

- attitude and position of the informant candidate.

2. Development of specific
  - attitudes,
  - behaviors, and
  - reactions of the candidate to be recruited;
- assessment of their
  - operational suitability,
  - honesty, and
  - reliability.

3. Comprehensive clarification of
- the connections within their social circle and
- the nature of the influence these connections have on the candidate.

4. Thorough knowledge of their
- character traits,
- outlook on life,
- areas of interest, and
- especially their attitude toward the security policy of our state.

This information about the IM candidate represents basic information,
- which, however, would need to be further
  - differentiated and
  - developed
  - according to the required profile for the IM candidate to be created.

For example:
1. Assessment of the candidate's actual performance characteristics.
2. Relationship between the candidate and individual caregivers such as ([illegible]DJ) parents, teachers, instructors, coaches, and the intensity of these individuals' influence on the candidate.
3. Particularly pronounced inclinations and attitudes towards trends among young people.
4. Career and educational goals.
5. Attitude towards work.
6. How he spends his free time and to what extent he has control over it.

This information should be
- obtained primarily through informant operations and
- supplemented by proven operational methods of Lines VIII and M.

Official assessments and evaluations from schools and businesses are also included.

The overall aim is
- to prevent any bias resulting from the exclusive use of officially available information.

It is important to note that
- investigations and vetting of young informant candidates do not always provide an operational answer to every question; that is,
  - a definitive, complete picture is not possible.

This picture must be refined and expanded during the initial contact/cooperation.

Crucial to this process is the operational collaborator getting to know the candidate personally, for example, under the following cover stories:
- Recruitment interviews
  - conducted by the military district command.
- Contacting high schools, for example,
  - as part of public relations efforts;
- getting to know candidates
  - through participation in discussions with socially disadvantaged youth.
- Participation in
  - interrogations,
  - interviews, and
  - discussions with the K, Youth Welfare Department, and Internal Affairs Division.

In this way, it is possible to
- use
  - argumentation skills and
  - knowledge of the candidate's psychology in a targeted and conscious manner
- for the recruitment process.

The candidate is significantly influenced by
  - his parents and other caregivers,
  - their attitude and
  - the candidate's position, especially
- regarding the maintenance of secrecy.

It proved advantageous to
- establish contact with the young IM candidate and

- gradually introduce him to solving the operational tasks of the MfS .

An immediate commitment has not proven effective.

The beginning of the recruitment process is of paramount importance as the starting point for further operational work.

Questions to consider include:
- what specific aspects need to be taken into account
  - when contacting the young informant candidate;
- which premises are suitable for the initial meeting and
  - can they be used; and
- what content and form the initial meeting with the young person should and should take.

It must be examined
- to what extent the involvement of
  - a parent or
  - guardian regarding the planned contact with the IM candidate
- appears necessary
  - or advantageous and
- how it is disguised.

When choosing a location for the initial meeting,
it is important to consider that,
- firstly, the room ensures confidentiality;
- secondly, it is suitable for the young person's personality; and
- thirdly, its outward appearance guarantees a confidential conversation.

For example,
- rooms in
  - factories,
  - schools,
  - military command facilities,
  - FDJ (Free German Youth) offices,
  - district councils, or city halls
- can all meet these requirements.

Content of the initial contact meeting:
1. Establishing confidential relationships

- operational staff and IM candidate,
  - developing initial conviction
    - for unofficial cooperation with the IM candidate,
  - laying the foundation
    - for further meetings with him.

2. to further study and verify the IM candidate during the interview,

3. to uphold the principles of the conspiracy and
   - to ensure that the candidate will observe them in further cooperation.

Preparations for this initial meeting:

Consider questions such as:
- What political and ideological attitudes does the IM candidate hold,
- what social development has the candidate undergone, or
  - from which social milieu does he come,
- how has his personal maturity developed,
- what level of intelligence does he possess,
- where do his areas of interest lie?

It has proven advantageous when
- an operational staff member conducts the interview
- with the candidate alone.

It is worth noting that feelings are generally more pronounced in young people than in adults;
- young people want to be taken seriously,
- not to be subjected to empty conversations,
- to pay attention to questions that interest the young people, and
- the employee emphasizes that he himself has knowledge of such things, and
  - not to make reproaches or derogatory remarks about
    - fashionable, outward appearance, if any.

The informant must be
- friendly,
- assertive, and
- enthusiastic,
- setting a good example and
- earning the young person's respect.

They must address the informant's problems, for example,
- with students in extended secondary schools (EOS),
- regarding later university studies,
  - socially disadvantaged situations,
    - employment, and
    - family circumstances.

They must
- cultivate a belief in
  - the informant's suitability for unofficial cooperation,
- examine and establish
  - existing motives for this in the informant candidate, and
- develop and solidify these motives.

They must
- motivate young people to
  - embrace unofficial cooperation with the Ministry for State Security (MfS).

- 1. Politically and ideologically progressive attitude towards the social order of the GDR,
- hope of securing a university place,
- thirst for
  - adventure and
  - sensationalism,
  - restitution especially for criminally involved young people.

Another aim of the initial contact meeting is
- to create a suitable starting point for further unofficial meetings.

It is advantageous for the content of these meetings if
- the young person can be asked about individuals in their circle of acquaintances
  - who are already known to the Stasi.

However, this presents two risks:

1. The IM candidate,
- due to a false sense of solidarity,
- does not disclose existing knowledge about this person and remains closed off to the MfS,

- so that the objective of the conversation, establishing confidential relationships and developing initial conviction of unofficial cooperation, is not achieved.

2. If there is a risk
- of our interests being exposed, or
- of our possible measures or intentions concerning certain young people,
- then it must be taken into account that
    - the young informant candidate may have a much stronger,
        - more emotionally attached
    - relationship with his circle of friends than with the Stasi, and
  - may "warn" these people.

It is advantageous
- to question the informant candidate about
  - individuals who exhibit behaviors that
    - the informant knows to
      - disapprove of and
      - reject.

It is also helpful
- to ask them to provide
    - nicknames
    - of young people from negative groups and circles,
    - whose real names the informant knows.
- If the informant candidate recognizes these individuals and names them,
  - this demonstrates
    - an initial point of contact for establishing trust.

Strict emphasis must be placed on maintaining secrecy,
- with the candidate simultaneously
  - being assured that their information will be treated confidentially by the Stasi and
  - that they will be required to sign a written confidentiality agreement.

At the same time, the prospective informant
- must be given instructions on
  - how to make their conversation with the operative
    - illegible to other persons.

It is disadvantageous
- to give the IM candidate a code name during the initial contact meeting or

- to ask him for one.

Specific considerations for contact meetings with young people who are incarcerated in detention facilities.

These young people, after their release from prison,
- often enjoy a certain level of trust among
  - socially vulnerable youth and
- are easily integrated into
  - suspicious youth groups/clusters/concentrations.

Furthermore, a relatively comprehensive record exists regarding
- their personality,
- suitability, and
- future deployment options,
- stemming from
  - previous investigations and
  - court proceedings.

If possible, it is beneficial
- to assist those released from prison
  - upon their return to the civilian sector.